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ABSTRACT: This paper investigates how land acquisition during urbanization affects labor 
allocation decisions of farm households in China. We develop an agricultural household model 
by including land acquisition to examine its impacts on nonfarm labor participation and income. 
Two datasets (self-designed household surveys at Xingwen County in 2012 and the China 
Household Finance Survey (CHFS) data covering 29 provinces in 2013) are adopted for 
empirical analysis. The results find that land reduction has significantly positive effects on the 
probability and the share of family nonfarm labor allocation from both datasets. We also find that 
land acquisition increases the household income of the land acquisition group in CHFS data.   
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1. Introduction 
China has been experiencing rapid urbanization since the 1990s, with an urbanization rate 
rising from 26% in 1990 to 53% in 2013 (World Bank, 2014). Driven by increasing land demand 
for urban expansion, Chinese local governments massively acquire suburban rural land and 
transform them to urban land. As a result, more and more farmers have lost most of their land 
and have become a huge special group in China. 2  The total population of this group was 
estimated to be 40-50 million in 2010, with a growth rate of 3 million per year, and will reach 
110 million by 2030 (Pan and Wei, 2011). Since land is the most important asset for Chinese 
farm households who do not qualify for essential welfare systems and lack of human capital, 
land acquisition may bring livelihood shocks to those affected households.3 One important area 
of investigation is to examine the welfare effects of land acquisition on whether the affected 
households have sustainable livelihoods. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the affected farm households respond to land 
acquisition on nonfarm labor allocation decisions and the related income effects. The increasing 
nonfarm labor participation and income growth serve as indicators of welfare improvement, 
which is suggested by the literature on off-farm employment in rural China (Uchida et al., 2009). 
In addition, a sustainable livelihoods framework shows that livelihood behaviors are highly 
related to livelihood assets, and any change in household assets would bring behavior 
adjustments in the pursuit of sustainable livelihoods (Scoones, 1998). As 
                                                     
2 According to China’s land acquisition policy, this group statistically refers to those whose land size after land 
acquisition is below 0.3 mu (1 mu = 0.165 acre). 
3 See Yeh and Wu (1996), Ding (2007), and He et al. (2009). 
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land acquisition leads to the decrease of land assets and the gaining of monetary payments as 
compensation, it might induce households to reallocate labor endowments from farm to nonfarm 
sectors. This adjustment process is the key for family sustainable livelihoods since nonfarm 
activities contribute to rural income growth (Zhang et al., 2002; Yang, 2004), poverty reduction 
(Du et al., 2005), and welfare improvement (Uchida et al., 2009). Furthermore, from the 
perspective of economic efficiency, policy measures would be more effective when they begin 
with an understanding of household-level behaviors (Chambers and Conway, 1992). Hence, it is 
of significance to study the impact of land acquisition on nonfarm labor allocation decisions and 
income.  
We extend the agricultural household model following Benjamin (1992) by including land 
acquisition. The model yields three main hypotheses: first, when compensation price is lower 
than a certain critical value, the shock of land reduction would increase family nonfarm labor 
participation; second, the higher the compensation price, the less the family labors allocating to 
nonfarm activities due to the income effect; third, land acquisition would increase family income 
when compensation price is greater than a critical value. Two datasets (self-designed household 
surveys at Xingwen County in 2012 and the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) data 
covering 29 provinces in 2013) are adopted for empirical analysis. The results show that land 
reduction has significantly positive effects on the probability and the share of family nonfarm 
labor allocation. We do not find that land acquisition increases the income levels in Xingwen 
County, but do find the incomes are significantly higher in the households with land acquisition 
than those without land acquisition in CHFS data. We also find that the negative effect of 
compensation price on nonfarm labor input is not statistically significant in CHFS data. In 
addition, we find that human capital significantly contributes to both labor allocation and 
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income, suggesting that households with less human capital have bigger difficulties in labor 
adjustment and income growth. Hence, a special policy is needed to stimulate their nonfarm 
employment and help to accumulate essential livelihood assets. 
Our study contributes to existing literature in three aspects. First, we investigate how farm 
households affected by land acquisition adjust their nonfarm labor allocation from the 
perspective of economic efficiency, which differs from other literature that either focus on 
China’s ambiguous land property rights and inadequate compensation from the perspective of 
equity (Chan, 2003; Zou and Oskam, 2007; Po, 2011; Zhao and Webster, 2011) or focus on the 
outer shocks such as exchange rate and intra-industry trade on labor employment (Chang, 2010; 
Yang and Liou, 2013). Second, our study adds more evidence in examining the fundamental 
question of how public policies affect the nonfarm labor allocation of farm households in China. 
Existing literature focus on rural land arrangements (Yang, 1997; Zhao, 1999; Mullan et al., 
2011) and rural-urban segmentation policy (Yang, 1999; Yang, 2004), but neglect the land 
acquisition policy, a new land arrangement arising during rapid urbanization in the past 20 years. 
Our work fills in this gap. Third, this study contributes to existing literature by examining the 
impact of government payments, as an important financial asset, on farm households’ nonfarm 
labor supply. The existing literature study the government payment effect on the labor 
participation without decreasing their landholding (Aheran et al., 2006; El-Osta et al., 2008; 
Pandit et al., 2013; Uchida et al.; 2009).  Differently we focus on the effects of compensation 
payments for the acquired landholding.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the land 
acquisition policy in China’s urbanization process. Section 3 develops an agricultural household 
model by including land acquisition and puts forward three main hypotheses. Section 4 conducts 
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empirical analysis based on the model and presents the empirical findings. Conclusion follows as 
the final section. 
2. Urbanization and land acquisition policy in China 
Since the 1990s, China has been experiencing rapid economic growth and urban expansion 
which has led to increasing land demand. To meet these demands, land acquisition is the primary 
solution used by Chinese local governments. Therefore, the process of China’s urbanization is 
associated with the conversion of rural land to urban land (Yeh and Wu, 1996; Ghatak and 
Mookherjee, 2013). 
It is generally thought that the compensation for the lost land is low. According to China’s 
Land Administration Law, farm land is collectively owned and local governments have the 
extensive power to acquire farm land compulsorily; farm households have the right to use the 
land allocated to them for agriculture use but have no property rights over the land. Therefore, 
when land is acquired, governments only compensate households based on the farm output value 
of the land instead of its market price. According to compensation forms, Chinese land 
acquisition policy history can be divided into two stages. 
The first stage is 1990-1998. Following the 1986 version of the Land Administration Law, 
governments compensated farmers with a policy package that contained four main components: 
compensation for the land, resettlement subsidies for farm labor, compensation for crops and 
attachments on the land, and labor resettlement. In monetary compensation, the sum of land 
compensation and labor resettlement subsidies should not have exceeded 20 times the average 
annual output value of the land in the preceding three years before land acquisition (Ding, 2007). 
This compensation level was not high and thus governments provided job offers and urban 
residency certificates (hukou) to the affected farmers. Under unequal urban-rural welfare system, 
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the job offers in enterprises established on the acquired land and urban residency certificates 
made the affected farmers eligible for urban social welfare services, so these intangible benefits 
were appealing to farmers. Meanwhile, since the scale of land acquisition for urban use was 
relatively small and the appreciation of farm land was limited, there were seldom conflicts 
resulting from land acquisition at that time. 
Rapid economic growth and urbanization prompted China to revise its Land Administration 
Law in 1998, which brought the land acquisition policy into its second stage. According to the 
1998 version, the total amount of land compensation and labor resettlement subsidies increased 
to the level that should not be greater than 30 times the average annual output value of the land 
in the preceding three years before land acquisition. However, governments typically did not 
provide job offers for the affected laborers. Since the new land compensation level could not 
cover the loss of employment opportunities and social security provided by farm land, and the 
rapid urban expansion raised the market price of the land acquired, social tensions caused by 
land acquisition became higher. For example, according to our survey data from Xingwen 
County in southwestern China, the compensation standard per unit land size (mu) was 45,000 
yuan in 2010, 30 times the derived land productivity; but the market price of adjacent land 
converted from farm land to commercial land was 290,000 yuan. The discrepancy between urban 
land value and compensation for the acquired farm land has become one of the economic roots of 
increasing rural unrest (Ding and Lichtenberg, 2011).  
To solve these problems, Chinese central government made policies to emphasize employment 
support and social security system construction for land-lost farm households in 2004, including 
paying unemployment insurance benefits to laborers and pensions to the elderly. However, these 
measures were only implemented in some provinces. Currently, the central government highly 
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emphasizes a compensation principle of maintaining constant living standard for affected 
farmers, but there are still no detailed and effective implementation measures. 
3 Theoretical models 
3.1 Preferences, constraints and optimal values 
Following Benjamin (1992), we develop an agricultural household model by including 
parameters of land acquisition. The agricultural household model is actually a time allocation 
model that depicts how the household allocates his time endowment. The farm household is 
assumed to have preferences not only over the services provided by consumption goods and 
leisure time, but also over the livelihood security provided by wealth that is related to land assets. 
The representative household maximizes the following utility function: 
 
WLCUWLCU ll += ),();,(  
(1) 
where C, Ll, and W are consumption good, leisure, and wealth, respectively. The utility of wealth 
is treated as exogenous. Following Mankiw (1988), the household maximizes a Cobb-Douglas 
utility function over current consumption of the single purchased good (C) and leisure (Ll): 
 ll
LCLCU log)1(log),(  −+=
 
(2) 
where 10  . Utility is maximized subject to a budget constraint: 
 
iAywLQpypC awaa )'(++==   
(3) 
where p is the price of goods consumed; y is the total income including farm income, nonfarm 
labor income, and the income from compensation payment. Here y equals consumption 
expenditure when there are no savings. In detail, farm income is determined by the quantity and 
price of farm output. By setting farm output price ( ap ) equal to 1, farm income only depends on 
farm output 
aQ . Nonfarm labor income may come from wage employment and self-employment. 
For simplicity, we only introduce wage earnings depending on market wage rate ( w ) and 
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nonfarm labor input (Lw). Compensation payment ( 'Aya ) is the product of compensation price 
per unit land size ( ay ) times land area acquired ( A ). i is the annual rate of return on the 
investment of such compensation, 10  i .  Parameters ( Aywp a ,,, ) are greater than zero.  
The household also faces a time constraint. Time endowment (T) includes farm labor input 
(La), nonfarm labor input (Lw), and leisure (Ll): 
 lwa
LLLT ++=
 
(4) 
where 0T  and 0,, lwa LLL . Besides, the household also faces an agricultural production 
technology constraint that describes the relationship between farm inputs and outputs. More 
population and less land in China result in that most farm households operate the farm by self-
employment, so we assume that the representative household does not hire nonfamily workers. 
Hence, the farm production function is: 
 
rr
aa AALQ
−−= 1)'(
            
)'( AA 
  
(5) 
where A is the land size before land acquisition, 0A ; 'AA−  is the remaining land size; r is the 
elasticity coefficient of factor input, 10  r . Both functions, U and Qa, are assumed to be 
increasing and concave. Qa equals to zero if 'AA = , meaning that all the family land is acquired. 
Substituting Eq. (4)-(5) into (3), we obtain a single constraint: 
 
  MiAywTwLAALwLpC aarral =++−−=+ − )'()'( 1  (6) 
where consumption of goods and leisure equals full income M, which is composed of farm 
profits, value of time endowment, and the income from the compensation payment. According to 
Mankiw (1988), the Cobb-Douglas utility function implies that the constant share of M,  , is 
devoted to consumption, and  is the marginal propensity to consume. Hence, we obtain the 
relationship of full income, consumption and leisure: 
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 MypC ==   (7) 
 
M
w
Ll
−
=
1
  (8) 
Besides consumption and leisure, wealth (W) is an important component in utility function for 
providing household security and economic and political power (Hill, 2000), and can be 
accumulated through savings, inheritance, or appreciation of household assets (Mishra et al., 
2002). In China, land is the most important asset to farm households and is also a valuable asset 
in the long run (Zhao, 1999). Since suburban farm land has a huge appreciation potential due to 
its scarcity during urban expansion, family wealth depends to a large extent on the owned land 
asset. Assume W is exogenously determined by land appreciation in the future: 
 
)'( AAVW a −=   
(9) 
where 
aV  
is land appreciation per unit area, which is the difference between the market price and 
farm output value of the land taken, 0aV ; 'AA−  is the remaining land size. 
Substituting budget constraint (3) and production constraint (5) into direct utility function (1) 
yields an indirect utility function that depicts the time allocation decision of the farm household: 
 
WLLLVWLLLV lwalwa += ),,();,,(  
(10) 
This indirect utility function is maximized only subject to time constraint (4). Hence, the 
household’s optimization problem can be summarized as follows: 
 





+−+
++−
=+
−
WL
p
iAywLAAL
WLLLV l
aw
rr
a
LLL
lwa
LLL lwalwa
log)1(
)'()'(
logmax),,(max
1
,,,,
  (11) 
subject to lwa LLLT ++= .
 
To solve this constrained optimization, we set up a Lagrangian function: 
 
)();,,(),,,( lwalwalwa LLLTWLLLVLLLZ −−−+=   
 (12) 
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where  is the Lagrangian multiplier. The first-order conditions are: 
 
0    0 =


=


=


=



Z
L
Z
L
Z
L
Z
lwa
，
  
(13) 
By solving Eq. (13), we derive the optimal family time allocation: 
 
( ) )1(1* )'( ra wrAAL
−
−=
 
 (14) 
 
 iAywTwrrAA
w
L a
rr
l )'())(1)('(
1 )1(* ++−−
−
= −

  
(15) 
 
 iAywTwrrAA
w
wrAATL a
rrr
w )'())(1)('(
1
))('( )1()1(1* ++−−
−
−−−= −−

  
(16) 
Substituting Eq. (15) into (8), we obtain the optimal full income M* composed of maximized 
farm profits, value of time endowment, and the income from the compensation payment: 
 
iAywTwrrAAM a
rr )'())(1)('( )1(* ++−−= −
  
(17) 
Substituting optimal time input equations (14)-(16) into income function (3) and utility 
function (1), we derive the optimal values of total income ),( *** wa LLy  
and utility 
);,,( **** WLLLV lwa  
of the representative household:  
 
 iAywrAArwTMLLy arrwa )'())(')(1(),( )1(**** +−−+== −   (18) 
 






+−+
++
= WL
p
iAyLyLy
WLLLV l
awwaa
lwa
*
****
**** log)1(
)'()()(
log);,,( 
  
(19) 
3.2 Comparative static analysis 
We conduct the comparative static analyses to find out how land area acquired 'A  and 
compensation price ay  affect the nonfarm labor allocation and income in this section. 
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3.2.1 Effects of land acquisition on household labor reallocation decisions 
First, by taking partial derivatives with respect to 'A
 
in Eq. (14)-(16), we derive the effects of 
land reduction on household time distribution decisions: 
 
( ) )1(1
*
'
ra wr
A
L −
−=


  
(20) 
 
( ) )1(
*
)1(
1
'
rr
a
l wrriy
wA
L −
−−
−
=

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(21) 
 
( ) ( ) iywrr
w
wr
A
L
a
rrrw −−
−
+=

 −− )1()1(1
*
)1(
1
'

  
(22) 
In Eq. (20), 0
'
*



A
La , showing that land reduction ( 0'A ) would decrease farm labor input 
which is determined by farm production technology. Given household time endowment, the total 
time of other two activities (
''
**
A
L
A
L wl


+


) would rise, but the respective effects of land acquisition 
on them are uncertain which depends on the value of related parameters ( iywr a ,,,,  ). We focus 
on the value of compensation price ( ay ).  
According to Eq. (22), 
'
*
A
Lw


 
is determined by two items: the former is the change of farm 
production time and the latter is the change of leisure time. We can easily calculate: 
 
0
'
*



A
Lw , when ( ) ( ) 





−
+−
−− )1(1)1(
1
)1(
1 rrr
a wr
w
wrr
i
y

  (23) 
which indicates that land reduction would increase family nonfarm labor input when the 
compensation price set by the government ( ay ) is lower than a critical value, which is the 
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product of a multiplier (1/i) with the summation of the reduced farm profit 4 ( )
)1(
)1(
rr
wrr
−
−  and 
the required full income payment ( ) )1(1
1
r
wr
w −
−
.  For the latter, according to the relationship 
between full income and leisure in Eq. (8), it corresponds to the possible newly added leisure 
time ( ) )1(1 rwr −  that comes from the reduced farm production time. On the contrary, when the 
compensation price (
ay ) is higher than this critical value, land reduction would lead to a 
decrease in nonfarm employment. This explains the phenomena that some farmers leave labor 
market after land acquisition in eastern China where compensation prices are very high. 
To further explain the labor adjustment affected by land acquisition, we analyze the impact of 
land reduction on household welfare by taking a partial derivative with respect to 'A
 
in Eq. (19). 
 
 *)1(
*
*
*
*
*
*
))(1(
1
'
1
''
MVwrriy
M
V
A
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y
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V
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l
l
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
−
+


=

 −
  
(24) 
Eq. (24) shows that the welfare effect of land acquisition is composed of three items: the first tw
o items are the effects of land acquisition on income and leisure, respectively; and the third item 
( aV− ) is the loss of land appreciation. We can easily calculate: 
 
0
'
*



A
V
 
, when  *)1())(1(1 MVwrr
i
y a
rr
a +−
−
  
(25) 
where 
*MVa  
is the product of value appreciation per unit land area times optimal full income. Eq. 
(25) indicates that land reduction would decrease household welfare if the compensation price 
cannot cover the value that is the product of a multiplier (1/i) with the summation of the reduced 
farm profit and the value appreciation of the acquired land. In practice, compensation prices set 
by Chinese local governments are only based on farm output value, not considering land 
                                                     
4 The first term in Eq. (17), )1())(1)('( rrwrrAA −−− , is farm profit function. By taking partial derivative with 
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appreciation which is much higher than the compensation standard. Obviously such 
compensation level may decrease household welfare and thus provide an explanation to the 
increasing nonfarm labor input after land acquisition.  
Second, by taking the partial derivative with respect to 
ay  
in Eq. (16), we derive the effect of 
the compensation price set by local government on household nonfarm employment: 
 
iA
wy
L
a
w '
1* −
−=


  (26) 
In Eq. (26), 
a
w
y
L

 *
 
is negative, showing that compensation price is inversely related to nonfarm lab
or input. Given other parameters, the effect of compensation price on labor reallocation depends 
on the land area acquired. The larger the land area acquired, the stronger the effect of compensati
on price on nonfarm labor reallocation. 
3.2.2 Effect of land acquisition on household income 
First, by taking partial derivatives with respect to 'A
 
in Eq. (18), we derive the effect of land  
reduction on household income: 
 
 )1(
*
))(1(
'
rr
a wrriy
A
y −−−=



 
(27) 
Eq. (27) shows that the effect of land acquisition on current income is determined by the 
relationship between the average investment return of compensation payment ( iya ) and the 
reduced farm profit 
)1())(1( rrwrr −− . This effect would be positive ( 0
'
*



A
y
) if the former is 
higher than the latter. On one hand, according to China’s Land Administration Law, the 
compensation price for land use, ay , should be 10-30 times the average annual output value of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
respective to 'A , we derive that the change of farm profit is )1())(1( rrwrr −−− . 
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acquired land in the preceding three years. Under this institutional arrangement and given other 
parameters, the higher the compensation price, the stronger the effect of land acquisition on 
income. On the other hand, the rate of return on the investment of compensation ( i ) depends on 
household’s choices after land acquisition. According to the CHFS data in 2013, most Chinese 
rural households invest assets in risk-free assets such as deposits and treasury bills; the ratio of 
investment in risk assets for rural households and the households with land acquisition are only 
1.45% and 1.86%, respectively. Hence we could assume the parameter i is constant. Under this 
condition, we can easily calculate: 
 
0
'
*



A
y
 
, when 
)1())(1(
1 rr
a wrr
i
y −−
  
(28) 
which shows that the effect of land acquisition on income would be positive when compensation 
price ay  is higher than a critical value, which is the multiplier of the reduced farm profit. 
Second, by taking a partial derivative with respect to 
ay  
in Eq. (18), we derive the effect of 
compensation price on household current income: 
 
iA
y
y
a
=



*
 (29) 
which shows that compensation price is positively related with family income. This is 
determined by the definition of Eq. (18) in which the income from compensation payment is a 
component of total income. It is an obvious fact and thus would not be tested in our regression. 
    In summary, the main hypotheses concerning the effects of land acquisition on nonfarm labor 
allocation and income can be stated as follows: (1) land reduction would increase family 
nonfarm labor supply when compensation price is below a certain critical value (the product of a 
multiplier with the summation of the reduced farm profit  and the required full income payment); 
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(2) compensation price would be negatively related with nonfarm labor input; and (3) land 
acquisition would increase family income when compensation price is higher than a critical 
value (the multiplier of the reduced farm profit). The following section will use two survey data 
to test these hypotheses.  
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Econometric specification 
    To estimate the nonfarm labor allocation function of farm households affected by land 
acquisition, as in Eq. (16), we use the following specification: 
 0 1 2 1 3 2 4 3
(  )wL LAND ACQUISITION X X X     = + + + + +   (30) 
where Lw is nonfarm labor input; LAND ACQUISITION characterizes variables of land reduction 
and compensation. X1 (land size), X2 (human capital), and X3 (household composition) are control 
variables measuring household characteristics. The parameters to be estimated are 0, 1, 2, 3, 
and 4.  is the stochastic error term. 
The empirical analysis of nonfarm labor allocation is conducted on the household level 
without recognizing the head of the household. For household laborers, farm and nonfarm 
employment are classified by their major activities (Zhang and Li, 2003; Yang, 2004). For 
instance, a person engaged primarily in a wage job and secondarily in farm production is 
classified as nonfarm labor. Following Goodwin and Holt (2002), we measure labor allocation 
decisions by both the binary farm/nonfarm work decision and the degree of nonfarm labor 
participation. The latter is measured by the share of laborers in nonfarm activities.  
The land acquisition is a dummy variable (being 1 if the land is acquired, 0 otherwise). If the 
land is acquired, we further look at how much land area is acquired, the related compensation 
price and total payments. The total amount of compensation includes three items in China: 
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compensation for farm land, resettlement subsidies for the affected laborers, and compensation 
for crops and attachments on the land. Compensation amount is introduced to estimate the 
impact of government payments, as financial capital, on labor participation decisions.  
Since natural capital, human capital, and household composition are important determinants of 
nonfarm labor allocation (Zhao 1999; Zhang and Li 2003; Yang 2004; Liang et al. 2012), we 
include them in specification (30) to control the effects of household characteristics. In detail, 
human capital (X2) is measured with family labor endowment (the number of laborers aged 16-60 
in the family), average education (the average years of schooling for all family laborers) and 
average age for all family laborers. Household composition (X3) is measured using two dummy 
variables: first, if the household has elderly over the age of 60; second, if the household has 
children under the age of 16. The elderly and children defined here do not belong to the labor 
force in our study, but they play an important role in family nonfarm labor allocation since they 
may affect the household time endowment (T) in Eq. (16). For example, in rural China, the 
elderly usually provide family support to their children by doing farm work and caring for the 
grandchildren, which may help to relax the constraints on nonfarm labor supply (Pang et al. 
2004). On the other hand, the presence of children would increase the home time of laborers and 
decrease their nonfarm working time (Zhao 1999; Liang et al. 2012).  
To estimate the household income function in Eq. (18), we use the following empirical form: 
 0 1 2 1 3 2 4
(  )Y LAND ACQUISITION X X H     = + + + + +
 (31) 
where Y is household income. LAND ACQUISTIION is defined the same as the above. X1 is land 
size; X2 is family human capital vector including laborer endowment, education, and age; H is 
housing area.  The literature (Zhang and Li 2003; Yang 2004; Liang et al. 2012) has documented 
natural capital and human capital as important factors affecting farm household income. The 
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housing area is included as physical capital because urbanization makes the livelihoods of 
suburban households rely on housing as an economic resource. Housing provides not only space 
for production, access to income-earning opportunities, but also an income-generating asset in 
the form of rooms that can be rented out (Satterthwaite and Tacoli 2002).   
4.2 Data 
We use two data sets for our analysis. The first one is the survey data that we designed and 
implemented at five villages of Xingwen County in 2012. The data include 192 farm households 
whose lands were acquired with the detailed household-level information before and after land 
acquisition. The data have desirable features even though this before-after data set is specific and 
relatively small. First, Xingwen County is located in southwestern China and is a typically 
underdeveloped and agricultural county. According to the Population Census of China, the 
urbanization rate of Xingwen County in 2010 was 22.7%, 27 percent lower than the national 
level (NBS, 2012). Currently, its process of urbanization is accelerating, leading to the rapid 
increase of land acquisition. Second, the farm households affected by land acquisition in 
Xingwen County, compared to those in developed regions, are paid with lower compensation 
price under the budget constraints of local government. They also have a lower base of 
livelihood assets and nonfarm employment environment. Hence examining the determinants of 
nonfarm labor allocation and income in this type of households has more important policy 
implications. Finally, we study the same group person before and after land acquisition, which 
yields a good within-group analysis. Also, the data within a County have a more homogeneous 
nature from the macro shock. However, the limitation of this survey data is the lack of control 
group so it may cause potential bias due to sample selection problem. We, therefore, adopt 
another extensive data set covering national-level household data.  
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    The second data set is from the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) conducted by the 
Survey and Research Center for China Household Finance at Southwestern University of 
Finance and Economics. The CHFS started the first survey in 2011 and revised their results in 
2013. We use the most recent representative 2013 data set as the land acquisition is a one-time 
event. And most importantly, compared to the data collected in 2011, the sample size in 2013 has 
more than tripled, with about 28,000 households in 272 counties in 29 provinces (Tibet, Xinjiang, 
Macau and Hong Kong are not included) and are randomly selected. Therefore, the data in 2013 
are more representative in terms of economic development and geographic location at the 
province level and city level. In particular, this large sample includes the households with land 
acquisition and the control group without land acquisition, which serves as a good foundation for 
our empirical analysis. 
Table 1 presents the mean characteristics of surveyed households in Xingwen County. After 
eliminating observations with missing data, the sample contains 164 households and 328 
observations. Since the time of land acquisition is 2010, the data before and after land acquisition 
are in 2009 and 2011, respectively. The land size in general is proportional to the family size by 
the land reform policy in Mao era. The compensation price is the same at Xingwen County, and 
thus the difference in compensation payments comes from the land area acquired and 
compensation for crops and attachments on the land. During the urbanization process, the 
number of surveyed households participating in nonfarm activities increases from 118 before 
land acquisition to 143 after land acquisition, rising by 21.2%. As we can see from Table 1, both 
land size and nonfarm labor allocations have statistically significant differences before and after 
land acquisition. The average land size decreases from 3.08 mu to 1.16 mu, with a reduction of 
62.3%. These households reallocate more laborers to nonfarm sectors and both the average 
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number and share of nonfarm laborers have an overall growth after land acquisition. On average, 
about 64 percent of family laborers are allocated to nonfarm activities after land acquisition.  
There are no significant changes in the other variables before and after land acquisition in 
Table 1. The average housing area, education and age do not change significantly. The average 
income level rises a little and remains at the same level, between 10,000-20,000 yuan. In detail, 
the changes in household income level are different. After land acquisition, 12 percent of 
households have declining income, 43 percent of them keep income unchanged, and 45 percent 
of them have increasing income. 
Table 2 presents the mean characteristics of surveyed households using 2013 CHFS data. We 
start with 28,143 households, of which 9,428 households come from rural areas. We further 
reduce the data from 9,428 to 6,493 observations after removing missing numbers and outliers. 
Among them, there are 493 households with land acquisition and 6000 households without land 
acquisition. Column (1) and (2) list the summarized statistics of these two types of households. 
Similar to Xingwen County data presented at Table 1, the means in column (2) of Table 2 for 
households with land acquisition are close but slightly larger. Likewise, land size and nonfarm 
laborers are significantly different between the two types of households, showing that 
urbanization may increase the nonfarm labors. As it shows, the average compensation price is 
17.7 thousand yuan per mu, but the compensation prices are different at different County. 
Therefore, the difference in compensation amount comes from the compensation price, the land 
area acquired, and compensation for crops and attachments on the land. Finally, the housing 
values are significantly higher for households with land acquisition. This may be due to the fact 
that urbanization makes the house more valuable by being close to the city.  
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4.3 Estimation results 
This section further examines how land acquisition affects nonfarm labor allocation and 
income of the households. We first look at the land acquisition impact on nonfarm labor 
allocation using the same households before and after land acquisition in Xingwen County. We 
repeat the same exercise in the larger dataset across households with CHFS 2013 survey data. 
Then we look at the land acquisition impact on income in Xingwen County and in the national 
CHFS survey data.  
Table 3 reports regression results for nonfarm labor allocation based on Eq. (30) using survey 
data from Xingwen County before and after land acquisition. The first three columns examine if 
land acquisition affects the binary farm/nonfarm employment decision using a Logit model while 
the last three columns estimate the effects of land acquisition on the share of nonfarm labor input 
using a Tobit model.5 As we can see in columns (1) and (4), where the independent variable is “if 
the land is acquired”, the results show that land acquisition significantly increases the probability 
and the share of nonfarm labor allocation for those households after land acquisition. This 
finding is consistent with our hypothesis (1) that the land acquisition event significantly affects 
the nonfarm labor input. However, when we replace the “if the land is acquired” with the “actual 
land area acquired” in columns (2) and (5), we find that more land acquisition increases neither 
the probability nor the share of nonfarm labor allocation. Similarly, in columns (3) and (6), the 
compensation payments have no significant impact on the probability and the share of nonfarm 
labor participation. One explanation is that the lands acquired and the compensations do not vary 
                                                     
5  We conduct other regression using panel data and find consistent results, the paper reports the pooled data 
regression given only two years of data. We also repeat the same regression using the number of nonfarm laborers. 
The results are available upon request. 
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significantly across households. Our findings also indicate that compensations in Xingwen 
County are close to or lower than the critical value indicated in Eq. (23).6  
There are other control variables in Table 3 having significant impacts on the probability and 
the share of nonfarm labor allocation. Land size has a significantly negative impact on the 
household nonfarm employment choices, consistent with existing literature (Zhao, 1999; Yang, 
2004). The households with more laborers have a higher probability of pursuing nonfarm 
activities, even though the shares of nonfarm laborers are not necessarily higher. The average 
education significantly increases the shares of nonfarm employment. The households with 
younger laborers are more likely to increase nonfarm laborers, and the shares of nonfarm 
laborers are also significantly higher. These findings are consistent with existing literature 
(Zhang and Li, 2003; Yang, 2004; Liang et al., 2012). Finally, having children does not affect the 
labor allocation. We find that the households having elderly over the age of 60 are more likely to 
have nonfarm laborers, which fits with the Chinese culture that the elders help with much of the 
house work to free younger laborers to work outside the home.  
Table 4 reports similar regression results for nonfarm labor allocation using CHFS 2013 data. 
The first four columns examine if land acquisition affects the binary farm/nonfarm employment 
decision using a Logit model while the last four columns estimate the effects of land acquisition 
on the share of nonfarm laborers using a Tobit model. As we can see in columns (1) and (5), 
where the independent variable is “if the land is acquired”, the results show that the households 
with land acquisition are more likely to have nonfarm work and that the share of nonfarm 
laborers are significantly higher than those households without land acquisition. This is 
                                                     
6  The survey data show that differences exist in compensation payments among households. The average 
compensation payment for land loss is over 10 thousand yuan. The largest share of respondent households is 
compensated below 50 thousand yuan (42%). The second and third shares of respondent households are 
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consistent with our hypothesis (1). However, among the households with land acquisition, we 
find that the land area acquired and compensation amount have no statistically significant effects 
on nonfarm labor allocation. Furthermore, we find that compensation price has negative impacts 
on the probability and the share of nonfarm labor allocation, but the effects are not statistically 
significant, which do not provide strong support for hypothesis (2). 
The control variables are also similar to what we found in Table 3. Namely, land size has a 
significantly negative impact on household nonfarm employment choices. The households with 
more laborers, higher education and younger laborers are more likely to pursue nonfarm 
activities and, thus, have higher shares of nonfarm laborers. Finally, the households having more 
children are less likely to have nonfarm laborers and also have fewer shares of nonfarm laborers. 
Households having elderly over the age of 60 have significantly higher shares of nonfarm 
laborers. This is consistent with the observations in rural China that the presence of children 
would increase the home time of laborers and decrease their nonfarm working time (Zhao 1999; 
Liang et al. 2012) and that the elderly usually provide family support to their children by doing 
farm work and caring for the grandchildren (Pang et al. 2004).  
Table 5 presents the estimation results for the household income function in Eq. (31) using 
survey data from Xingwen County. Since the income level is an ordinal dependent variable from 
1 to 6, we use an ordered Probit model to estimate. As can be seen, the households with more 
laborers, higher average education, younger laborers and larger housing areas have significantly 
higher income, which is consistent with existing literature (Satterthwaite and Tacoli 2002; Zhang 
and Li 2003; Yang 2004; Liang et al. 2012). The land acquisition, land areas acquired, and 
compensations are with expected signs but not significant on the short run income, which do not 
                                                                                                                                                                           
compensated 50-100 thousand yuan (24%) and 100-200 thousand yuan (20%), respectively. Only 14 percent of 
households are compensated over 200 thousand yuan.  
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provide strong support for hypothesis (3). One conjecture is that the compensation price may be 
close to the critical value. Another explanation is that the income variables are not continuous 
variables and are at 1-6 levels, so they may neglect the fact that income may increase but not 
high enough to the higher level.  
Table 6 presents the land acquisition effect on household income using the CHFS data where 
we have control group without land acquisition. In this regression, the income is a continuous 
variable instead of income level as an ordinal dependent variable in Xingwen County. As we can 
see in the first column, the household incomes are significantly higher for those households with 
land acquisition. This is consistent with hypothesis (3). However, within the treatment group of 
households with land acquisition, the amount of land acquired, compensation price and total 
compensations have no further impacts on household income. Consistent with findings in 
Xingwen County, the households with more laborers, higher education, younger laborers and 
higher housing values have significantly higher income.  
In sum, the studies of both Xingwen County and CHFS data indicate that land acquisition in 
China increases the nonfarm labor allocation. we do not find household income improvement for 
Xingwen County after land acquisition while the CHFS national data analyses indicate that there 
is income improvement for the households with land acquisition when compared to the 
households without land acquisition. We also find that the negative effect of compensation price 
on nonfarm labor input is not statistically significant in CHFS data. In addition, our findings that 
human capital significantly contributes to both labor reallocation and income, suggesting that 
households with lower human capital have bigger difficulties in labor adjustment and income 
growth. Hence, a special policy is needed to stimulate their nonfarm employment and help to 
accumulate essential livelihood assets. 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates how land acquisition during urbanization affects labor allocation 
decisions of farm households in China. We develop an agricultural household model by 
including land acquisition to examine the effects on nonfarm labor participation and income. The 
model predicts that land acquisition would increase family nonfarm labor supply when 
compensation price is below a critical value. The compensation would contribute income 
improvement even though it could potentially reduce labor input due to income effect. 
To verify the above prediction, we use two datasets to conduct empirical tests. Using both 
datasets from household surveys in Xingwen County in 2012 and the extensive CHFS data 
covering 29 provinces in 2013, we find that land reduction has a significantly positive effect on 
family nonfarm labor allocation. In terms of income effect, we do not find significant results of 
land acquisition on household income levels in Xingwen County. However, with the control 
group in CHFS data, we do find that land acquisition increases the household income of the land 
acquisition group. Finally, we find that among the land acquisition group, the amount of land 
acquisition, compensation amount and price have no impact on nonfarm labor allocation and 
income.  Further research in welfare analysis is needed for more clear policy implication.   
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Table 1 Mean Characteristics of Household Sample, 2012 Xingwen County Survey Data 
Variable (1) Before land acquisition 
(in 2009) 
(2) After land acquisition 
(in 2011) 
Land size (mu)  3.08 (1.79) 1.16 (1.07)*** 
Land area acquired (mu) － 1.92 (1.39) 
Compensation payments (10,000 yuan) 0.00 (0.00) 10.19 (9.61)*** 
Compensation price (10,000 yuan) － 5.01 (1.29) 
Number of labors 2.45 (0.81) 2.31 (0.80) 
Number of nonfarm labors 1.02 (0.79) 1.45 (0.79)*** 
Share of nonfarm labors 0.41 (0.33) 0.64 (0.35)*** 
Average education (years) 7.72 (2.00) 7.87 (2.23) 
Average age (years) 37.25 (7.38) 38.93 (8.79)* 
If having children 0.37 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48) 
If having the elderly 0.18 (0.38) 0.18 (0.38) 
Housing area (square meter) 159.39 (92.98) 157.74 (70.86) 
Income level 2.42 (0.95) 2.57 (1.03) 
Observations 164 164 
Notes: (1) The data are mean value at household level; figures in parentheses are standard deviations; asterisks (***, 
** and *) denote that mean difference of relevant variables before and after land acquisition are statistically 
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. (2) mu = 0.165 acre. yuan = $0.16. (3) The labor force refers to 
population ages 16-60 that is economically active. (4) The income level is divided into six levels. It equals 1 for 
income below 10,000 yuan (not including 10,000 yuan), 2 for income between 10,000-20,000 yuan, 3 for income 
between 20,000-30,000 yuan, 4 for income between 30,000-40,000 yuan, 5 for income between 40,000-50,000 yuan, 
6 for income over 50,000 yuan. (5) The figures of compensation amount and income level are in 2011 prices. 
 
Table 2 Mean Characteristics of Household Sample, 2013 CHFS Survey Data 
Variable (1)Households without land 
acquisition (Control group) 
(2)Households with land 
acquisition (Treatment group) 
Land size (mu)  5.81 (23.67) 4.08 (9.45)** 
Land area acquired (mu) 0.00 (0.00) 3.53 (6.20)*** 
Compensation payments (10,000 yuan) 0.00 (0.00) 4.97 (15.94)*** 
Compensation price (10,000 yuan) 0.00 (0.00) 1.77 (4.79)*** 
Number of labors 2.69 (1.15) 2.73 (1.11) 
Number of nonfarm labors 1.13 (1.07) 1.32 (1.04)*** 
Share of nonfarm labors 0.41 (0.36) 0.48 (0.35)*** 
Average education (years) 7.53 (2.83) 8.07 (2.68)*** 
Average age (years) 39.52 (8.12) 39.38 (7.60) 
Number of children 1.12 (0.99) 1.02 (0.94) ** 
Number of the elderly 0.33 (0.60) 0.32 (0.59) 
Housing value (yuan) 168908.20 (497912.40) 343394.80 (740357.80)*** 
Annual income (yuan) 39585.49 (120934.6) 49065.82 (84548.44)** 
Observations 6000 493 
Notes: (1) The annual income is an absolute value, and the figures are in 2013 prices. (2) 2013 CHFS data only 
distinguish the household sample by the place of resident (rural or urban area), not by the place of domicile. So we 
could only use the household sample, living in rural area, in the analysis. 
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Table 3 Effects of Land Acquisition on Household Nonfarm Labor Allocation Decisions, 
2012 Xingwen County Survey Data 
Explanatory variable Dependent variable 
Household participating in nonfarm 
work = 1, Logit model 
Share of nonfarm labors, Tobit 
model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
If land is acquired 0.127*** 
(0.046) 
  0.273*** 
(0.078) 
  
ln (land area acquired)  0.031 
(0.028) 
  0.049 
(0.058) 
 
ln (compensation payment)   0.029    
(0.028) 
  0.030 
(0.054) 
ln (land size) -0.067** 
(0.027) 
-0.058** 
(0.027) 
-0.059** 
(0.027) 
-0.132*** 
(0.038) 
-0.132*** 
(0.047) 
-0.131*** 
(0.047) 
Number of labors 0.223*** 
(0.033) 
0.121*** 
(0.042) 
0.122*** 
(0.042) 
0.016 
(0.043) 
0.147** 
(0.065) 
0.146** 
(0.065) 
Average education 0.012   
(0.009) 
0.031***   
(0.009) 
0.031***  
(0.009) 
0.070*** 
(0.017) 
0.136*** 
(0.026) 
0.135*** 
(0.026) 
Average age -0.010*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.020*** 
(0.005) 
-0.016** 
(0.006) 
-0.016** 
(0.006) 
If having children 0.011   
(0.039) 
-0.001  
(0.048) 
-0.001   
(0.048) 
0.068 
(0.071) 
0.015 
(0.108) 
0.017 
(0.108) 
If having the elderly 0.176*** 
(0.053) 
0.039 
(0.058) 
0.041 
(0.058) 
0.252*** 
(0.090) 
0.080 
(0.134) 
0.088 
(0.135) 
Pseudo R2 0.334 0.434 0.432 0.181 0.218 0.217 
No. of observations 328 164 164 328 164 164 
Note: (1) standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * mean statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. (2) All reported results are marginal effects. The marginal effect for a dummy variable is the difference 
in probability of nonfarm employment relative to the period before land acquisition; for continuous variables, the 
effect is evaluated at the mean. 
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Table 4 Effects of Land Acquisition on Household Nonfarm Labor Allocation Decisions, 2013 CHFS Survey Data 
Explanatory variable Dependent variable 
Household participating in nonfarm work = 1, Logit model Share of nonfarm labors, Tobit model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
If land is acquired 0.044** 
(0.020) 
  
 0.047** 
(0.022) 
  
 
ln (land area acquired) 
 
0.012 
(0.023) 
 
 
 
0.016 
(0.029) 
 
 
ln (compensation payment) 
  
-0.003 
(0.018) 
 
  
-0.013 
(0.020) 
 
ln (compensation price) 
   
-0.023 
(0.024) 
   
-0.028 
(0.028) 
ln (land size) -0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Number of labors 0.097*** 
(0.005) 
0.094*** 
(0.018) 
0.094*** 
(0.018) 
0.095*** 
(0.017) 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.018) 
0.010 
(0.017) 
0.010 
(0.017) 
Average education 0.029*** 
(0.002) 
0.030*** 
(0.007) 
0.030*** 
(0.007) 
0.031*** 
(0.007) 
0.042*** 
(0.003) 
0.044*** 
(0.009) 
0.046*** 
(0.009) 
0.045*** 
(0.009) 
Average age -0.011*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.017*** 
(0.001) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Number of Children -0.020*** 
(0.006) 
-0.026 
(0.019) 
-0.025 
(0.019) 
-0.025 
(0.019) 
-0.020*** 
(0.007) 
-0.016 
(0.023) 
-0.015 
(0.023) 
-0.015 
(0.023) 
Nunber of the elderly 0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.039 
(0.027) 
-0.039 
(0.027) 
-0.040 
(0.027) 
0.041*** 
(0.011) 
-0.023 
(0.036) 
-0.025 
(0.036) 
-0.025 
(0.036) 
Pseudo R2 0.215 0.279 0.279 0.280 0.153 0.186 0.186 0.187 
No. of observations 6493 489 489 489 6493 493 493 493 
Note: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * mean statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. (2) The sample in the regressions from 
column (2) to (4) is 489 because four observations are dropped for multicollinearity.  
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Table 5 Effects of Land Acquisition on Household Income Level, 2012 Xingwen County 
Survey Data 
Explanation variable Dependent variable: household income level (ordered probit model) 
(1) (2) (3) 
If land is acquired 0.204 (0.153) － － 
ln (land area acquired) － 0.139 (0.108) － 
ln (compensation payment) － － 0.100 (0.100) 
ln (land size) -0.074 (0.070) -0.125 (0.083) -0.121 (0.083) 
Number of labors  0.592*** (0.089) 0.630*** (0.127) 0.627*** (0.128) 
Average education  0.133*** (0.034) 0.176*** (0.044) 0.174*** (0.044) 
Average age -0.039*** (0.009) -0.026** (0.010) -0.027** (0.011) 
ln (housing area) 0.569*** (0.145) 0.628*** (0.243) 0.640*** (0.246) 
Pseudo R2 0.161 0.171 0.169 
No. of observations 328 164 164 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * mean statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 6 Effects of Land Acquisition on Household Income, 2013 CHFS Survey Data 
Explanation variable Dependent variable: household income (OLS) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
If land is acquired 0.164** 
(0.073) 
   
ln (land area acquired)  0.035 
(0.116) 
  
ln (compensation payment)   0.115 
(0.077) 
 
ln (compensation price)    0.097 
(0.117) 
ln (land size) 0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.014) 
-0.006 
(0.014) 
Number of labors 0.254*** 
(0.018) 
0.385*** 
(0.066) 
0.375*** 
(0.067) 
0.381*** 
(0.067) 
Average education 0.119*** 
(0.008) 
0.111*** 
(0.032) 
0.104*** 
(0.031) 
0.109*** 
(0.031) 
Average age -0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
ln (housing value) 0.050*** 
(0.007) 
0.028 
(0.022) 
0.026 
(0.022) 
0.026 
(0.022) 
adj. R2 0.140 0.161 0.166 0.162 
No. of observations 6360 478 478 478 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * mean statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
